Pollak, Vida & Barer

In Medrano v. Acosta, published September 25, 2026, a divided panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed denial of summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 case. On a summer evening, the defendant officers received a report that the plaintiff had been seen leaving his girlfriend’s house and was headed to his father’s residence. They were familiar with the plaintiff, whom they believed to be a member of a local gang. One of the officers had learned that two weeks before, the plaintiff had fled from a traffic stop, and that he was on the run from a felony no-bail federal warrant for his arrest related to drug charges. The officer had also reported to a call from the plaintiff’s mother the day after the traffic stop, who reported that the plaintiff was acting erratically and had spray-painted on his wall that the police were out to get him. Three days before the officers received the report, the federal court had withdrawn the arrest warrant. But the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications system had not been updated to reflect the withdrawal, and still showed an active warrant. The officers therefore did not know of the withdrawal. The officers approached the back yard of the plaintiff’s father’s residence from the driveway of a neighboring house. The officers were separated from the backyard by a six-foot chain link fence with strips inserted that obscured visibility. The plaintiff was in the yard, accompanied by a dog who appeared to be a pit bull. From approximately 10-20 feet away, the officers drew their firearms, allegedly pointed them at the plaintiff’s head (although this fact was disputed, the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff), and commanded him to approach their position. It was still light outside. The plaintiff climbed over the fence without incident, and was handcuffed. The officers walked him to their car, transported him to police headquarters, and booked him for resisting arrest based on fleeing the earlier traffic stop. Federal marshalls took custody of him a few days later, and freed him because the arrest warrant had been withdrawn. The plaintiff sued the officers, alleging they had used excessive force to effectuate his arrest because they allegedly aimed their guns at his head during the arrest. The officers moved for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment. It found triable issues of fact on whether both officers had aimed their guns at plaintiff’s head, and that a reasonable juror could find aiming guns at plaintiff’s head under the circumstances would be a clear violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

The panel ruled that the officers were entitled to summary judgment. The majority ruled that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the officers did not use excessive force under the 4th Amendment by allegedly aiming their guns at the plaintiff’s head. Aiming guns at a suspect’s head is a high level of force. But based on the knowledge the officers had, the officers reasonably believed that the plaintiff may have committed multiple serious offenses; was actively on the run from a felony arrest warrant, posed an immediate threat to their safety, and might again attempt to flee. Under those circumstances, the officers’ use of force did not violate the plaintiff’s 4th Amendment right to be free from excessive force during arrest. All three judges ruled, in the alternative, that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, because their use of force under the circumstances did not violate rights clearly established under existing law. Ninth Circuit case law establishing that officers use excessive force when they aim their weapons at people who do not pose a threat, who have complied with the officers’ instructions, who are not resisting, and who do not attempt to flee did not square with the circumstances of the case, when viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than with 20-20 hindsight.

One judge concurred that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly-established constitutional rights, but dissented from the ruling that the officers complied with the 4th Amendment. The judge opined that a reasonable jury could find that the officers used excessive force under the circumstances.

Pollak, Vida & Barer represent the officers on appeal in this matter.