In Eagle Colton 55, LP v. City of Colton, published July 21, 2026, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division 1 reversed an order denying an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike. The city entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for the building and management of an affordable senior housing community. As part of the agreement, the parties executed a promissory note secured by a deed of trust that included a loan from the city to the plaintiff. The city issued a notice of breach of promissory note stating that the plaintiff was required to provide audited financial statements on an annual basis and had not done so. The plaintiff disputed the breach, but provided statements and the city rescinded the breach notice. The plaintiff’s negotiations with another city to develop a similar housing project fell through. In August 2024, the plaintiff sent the defendant city’s city attorney a letter outlining various claims, during a meeting with the plaintiff’s representatives to discuss the plaintiff’s claims. According to the plaintiff’s managing partner, upon accepting and reviewing the letter, the city council member stated he was obligated to disclose it to the city council at the next meeting and that he intended to do so. The managing partner also represents that the plaintiff’s representative told the city council member that he expected the council member to do so, and relied upon that statement in not deliving the the letter to the other council members. The council member declared it was not his role or practice to receive government claims on behalf of the city. He understood the documents he received during the meeting to be simply supporting materials for the plaintiff’s issue with the city. He did not forward or save the documents, and did not consider them to be a government claim. The city clerk represented in a declaration that she is responsible for accepting and processing all government claims submitted to the city at its principal office. She declared that no claim had been presented to the city at that ofice. In September 2024, 41 days after presenting the letter, the plaintiff sued the city for alleged intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, defamation, and similar causes of action. It alleged that the defendant city’s staff members had made comments to the other city’s officials regarding the plaintiff’s purported default on the note. It then filed an amended complaint alleging that it had complied with the Government Claims Act. The city filed an anti-SLAPP motion contending that the lawsuit dealt with constitutionally protected speech, and did not have a reasonable probability of prevailing due to the plaintiff’s failure to present a claim before filing suit. The trial court denied the motion.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion. It concluded that the lawsuit involved constitutionally-protected speech. It further concluded that the lawsuit did not have a reasonable probability of prevailing, because the plaintiff had failed to present a claim to the city before filing suit. The council member was not statutorily authorized to accept and process the plaintiff’s claim against the city. A single member of the city council is not the “board” or “governing body,” and delivering a letter to one member at at private meeting away from city hall, and where he did not recognize the letter as a claim and did not forward it to the city clerk or council, is not the equivalent of actual receipt by the proper recipients–the board or governing body. Further, the letter was labeled as a “Confidential Settlement Communication” and was not readily identifiable as a claim. The council member did not consider the letter to be a claim. Further, had the plaintiff meant the letter to be a claim, it would have given the city the 45 days the Act allocates a board to act on a claim after presentation. The plaintiff filed suit 41 days after presenting the letter, and made no mention in its initial complaint of complying with the act. If the plaintiff did not recognize the letter as a claim, it cannot be expected that the city council member would have done so. The plaintiff’s information and belief that the letter was delivered to the city clerk was insufficient to defeat an anti-SLAPP suit.
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