Pollak, Vida & Barer

In County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, published October 23, 2025, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 8 affirmed summary judgment in one consolidated appeal, and dismissal on demurrer in another. The plaintiff county filed a writ petition against its sheriff. Its county counsel sent the sheriff a letter notifying him the board of supervisors had agreed to offer the sheriff conflict counsel in the case under Government Code section 3100.6, subdivision (a). The letter informed the sheriff that he could select which independent counsel would represent him in the matter, but that under Government Code section 3100 the board has discretion to pay such compensation as it deems just and proper for the services. The sheriff selected the defendant law firm. The firm appeared for the sheriff in litigation, without the county’s objection. The firm e-mailed the sheriff an engagement letter for the matter, which included billing rates and an arbitration clause. The county counsel then submitted a retainer agreement to the defendant firm, setting forth lower rates and cited Government Code section 3100. The sheriff then signed the engagement letter the firm had sent him, without providing a copy to the county or obtaining approval from county counsel. The law firm rejected the terms in the county’s proposed retainer agreement. After hearings on whether the firm could be confirmed as the sheriff’s counsel or the county could have the firm removed as counsel under Government Code section 3100.6, the firm withdrew as the sheriff’s counsel, billing the sheriff over a million dollars for its services. Almost a year later the firm sent the sheriff’s department and the county a “Mandatory State Bar Approved Form” entitled “Notice of Client’s Right to Fee Arbitration. The notice identified an outstanding balance and stated the firm had a statutory right to fee arbitration. The notices stated that no lawsuit or arbitration had been filed, but may be filed if “we do not resolve this claim.” The county filed a lawsuit for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate and that the firm was precluded from arguing it had a valid contract with any county plaintiff for its representation of the sheriff. It also sought injunctive relief. The trial court granted the county’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the county was likely to prevail on its claim because the sheriff lacked statutory authority to enter into the fee contract. The court later granted the county summary judgment, based on the sheriff’s lack of authority to enter into the contract. After summary judgment was granted, but before the judgment was entered, the firm moved for leave to file a cross-complaint seeking its money. The trial court entered judgment for the county, and later denied the firm’s motion. It ruled that the law governing compulsory cross-complaints would not apply; that the firm could not file a cross-complaint after entry of judgment; and that, while a court must grant leave to file a cross-complaint if the party who failed to plead acted in good faith, it concluded there were grounds to find the firm acted in bad faith in delaying its cross-complaint. The firm appealed the judgment. The firm then filed a new lawsuit against the county, the sheriff’s department, and the sheriff in his official capacity, asserting the same causes of action that had been asserted in the arbitration request and the cross-complaint. The trial court sustained the county defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. The court found the new lawsuit barred by the compulsory cross-complaint law, and also that the firm had failed to show compliance with the Government Claims Act. The firm appealed from the resulting dismissal

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the county’s action. A public entity may only enter into contract if it has legal authority to do so; otherwise the contract is wholly void, ultra vires, and unenforceable. Because one who deals with a public officer is presumptively charged with full knowledge of that officer’s powers to bind government, the firm’s theory that the sheriff had ostensible authority to enter into a contract with the firm fails. No evidence indicates that the county delegated to the sheriff the power to enter into an agreement with a law firm; all communications from the county reserved the county’s board’s right to contract and to pay the compensation it deems just and proper. Neither estoppel nor ratification may be invoked to enforce a void contract. Regarding the firm’s cross-complaint the appellate court agreed with the firm’s argument that its cross-complaint was compulsory. But it ruled that the cross-complaint was not filed “during the course of the action” and affirmed the trial court’s finding that the delay in seeking leave to file constituted bad faith. Either ruling justifies the trial court’s denial of leave to file the cross-complaint. Regarding the firm’s separate lawsuit, the appellate court’s ruling that the cross-complaint was compulsory in the county’s action supports the trial court’s ruling sustaining the county defendants’ demurrer. As another ground supporting dismissal, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the firm had not alleged facts showing compliance with the Government Claims Act’s requirements that claims be presented in a timely manner and in accordance with specific procedures before any lawsuit is filed. The firm’s complaint does not allege compliance with the Act or its presentation requirement. The firm points to an allegation in the complaint that the firm served each defendant with the Notice of Client’s Right to Fee Arbitration. The notices were addressed to the sheriff and sheriff’s department at its address, and to the county at its address. The complaint did not allege how any of the notices were served, or upon whom. Nor did the fee arbitration notices themselves indicate how they were served or to which statutorily designated recipient they were delivered or mailed. Nor does the complaint allege the notices were actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor, or board within the time prescribed for presentation thereof. Further, even if one of the notices had been properly directed to a statutorily designated recipient, the court could not see how the county would have recognized the notice as an attempt to satisfy the claim presentation requirement. The requirement to serve a notice of insufficiency in response to a defective claim under Government Code sections 910.8 and 911 applies to the contents of the claim, not to the requirement for presentation to statutorily designated recipients.