In County of Nevada v. Superior Court (A.C.), published May 12, 2025, the Third District Court of Appeal issued a writ directing the trial court to grant summary judgment to a sheriff's deputy defendant and his agency. Multiple individuals called 911 about an erratically-acting woman walking along a street with two small children. The defendant sheriff's deputies were dispatched to the area to perform a welfare check on the woman and children. The first deputy pulled up behind the woman and attempted to speak with her. She did not respond. The second deputy then arrived. He understood he was to provide backup. The woman turned to the deputies, unsheathed a knife, and accused the officers of hurting her "babies." The first deputy drew his gun and pointed it at the ground in front of him. The second drew a taser. The first officer tried to talk the woman down. She continued complaining about her babies being threatened, and advanced toward the first deputy. He backed up to give her space. The woman alternated her focus betwen the two deputies. As one child repeatedly approached the first deputy, the woman took several quick steps toward the first deputy, who continued backing up. The second deputy lost sight of the first deputy around a patrol car, and so came around the front of the car with his taser and followed the woman. The woman suddenly turned and quickly advanced toward the second deputy while raising her knife. The second deputy discharged the taser. The woman continued to chase the second deputy into the street. The first deputy followed and shot the woman in the back. The woman passed away. These events occurred in less than two minutes. The events were captured on the deputies' bodycams. The children sued the deputies and the county that employed them for negligence, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. They asserted a separate cause of action against the second deputy, who used the taser, under the Bane Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the deputy who shot the woman, concluding he acted reasonably as a matter of law throughout the encounter and did not unreasonably use deadly force. It denied the motion as to the deputy who tased the woman, concluding that a reasonable juror could find he acted unreasonably by closing the distance between himself and the woman and by using his taser, and that he had acted with reckless disregard to her constitutional rights. The court denied the county's motion for summary judgment to the extent it could be held vicariously liable for the tasing deputy's conduct.
The appellate court ruled that as a matter of law the tasing deputy and the county were entitled to summary judgment, because as a matter of law the deputy acted reasonably under the circumstances. All of the causes of action turned on the allegation that the deputies' use of force against the woman was unreasonable. The plaintiffs did not dispute that the deputy using lethal force was entitled to summary judgment, and the appellate court agreed he acted reasonably as a matter of law. The plaintiffs contended that the tasing deputy's conduct was unreasonable, and created the need for the other deputy to use deadly force. There was no triable issue of material fact on whether the tasing deputy acted reasonably in closing the distance between himself and the woman. Applying the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, no reasonable juror could conclude the deputy's movement to maintain line of sight with the other deputy, as the woman advanced on him with a deadly weapon, was unreasonable. There was no triable issue as to whether the woman would be perceived as an immediate threat as she advanced toward one deputy with the knife, then suddenly turned and quickly advance toward the other while raising her weapon. There was no triable issue that it was not feasible for the deputy to warn the woman in the instant she turned and advanced before the deputy deployed the taser. No reasonable juror could conclude that firing the less-lethal taser under the circumstances was unreasonable. There is no material disputed fact on whether the deputy followed his training regarding welfare checks and contacting individuals with mental illness. A general order governing officer conduct in specific situations does not establish the standard of care for the use of force. Instead, the standard is whether the use is reasonable under the totality of circumstances. Even if the deputies' training required better or more reasonable actions, as long as the deputies' actions were within the range of what was reasonable under the circumstances, they need not have chosen the "most reasonable" action. Both the tasing deputy and the county were entitled to summary judgment.
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