In Bakos v. Roach, published January 29, 2025, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Acting on a tip, level 2 humane officers of the Humane Society obtained a search warrant under Penal Code section 597.1, searched the plaintiff's pheasant hunting club, and seized multiple animals that appeared to the officers to be abused, neglected, or both. One of the officers issued a written Notice of Seizure of Animals stating the animals had been seized, setting forth the grounds, stating that the plaintiff was statutorily liable for the cost of the seizure and care of the seized animals, and that the animals would be deemed abandoned if the charges were not timely paid. Three days later, the Society wrote the plaintiff a letter stating that because the animals had been seized pursuant to a search warrant, section 597.1 did not provide for an administrative hearing; but that the Society nevertheless wanted to address the plaintiff's concerns and give him an opportunity to respond. The Society then obtained an order releasing the animals to it because the charges were not paid. The plaintiff sued the officers, individually and on behalf of the Society, alleging negligence and abuse of process. The defendants moved for summary judgment, challenging the action on its merits and also arguing the officers were entitled to discretionary immunity under Government Code section 820.2. The trial court ruled the officers were not entitled to immunity, but granted summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff could not establish the elements of his cause of action.
The appellate court ruled that when animals are seized under Penal Code section 597.1 under a warrant, subdivision (f) of section 597.1 entitles the animal owner to a postseizure administrative hearing. The plaintiff established triable issues of fact on whether there was injury to his property caused by the denial of an opportunity for a postseizure administrative hearing. After affirming summary adjudication of the abuse of process cause of action, the court addressed whether the officers were entitled to discretionary immunity. The court concluded that because under California law corporations for the prevention of cruelty to animals enforce applicable law and prosecute offenders , and under statute a level 2 humane officer may exercise the powers of a peace officer, the Humane Society and its officers exercised quasi-governmental powers, and were subject to governmental immunity statutes. Government Code section 820.2 immunity, however, does not apply where an individual defendant violated a statute, and immunity would frustrate the purpose of the statute violated. Granting immunity to the officers and Society here may frustrate the purpose of section 597.1 in providing due process via a postseizure administrative hearing. Further, it is not obvious that seizing animals or imposing costs under section 597.1 constituted policy decisions within the meaning of section 820.2. Defendants therefore did not establish section 820.2 immunity applies to them.
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