In LaMarr v. Regents of the University of California, ordered published April 23, 2024, the Third Appellate District affirmed a trial court's decision after a bench trial. The plaintiff was working as a coordinator Level V at a UC hospital's department. Her supervisor prepared but did not issue a Letter of Intent to Dismiss, based on performance issues. The supervisor's superior was concerned that this was an unusually expedited discipline procedure. The superior sought a transfer for the plaintiff to a different department, to defuse the situation. There were no Level V positions available, but he found a Level III position at another department that he offered to the plaintiff on a temporary basis at her Level V salary. He did not inform the plaintiff of the letter of intent to dismiss. The plaintiff took the position. The superior later discussed with the plaintiff making the position permanent. He informed her that if she stayed in the department, she would be a coordinator Level III with a lower salary. He informed her that her options were to do that; move back to the previous department as a coordinator Level III with the lower salary; or move back to the previous department as a Level V coordinator, but be subject to the "pending action" (the notice of intent to dismiss) that was put on hold and never issued. This was the first the plaintiff learned of the letter of intent. The plaintiff stated she would remain at the transferred department, so that she would not return to the "hostile atmosphere" of her previous department. Both the plaintiff and the superior knew that the plaintiff would be given a Skelly hearing if the supervisor had moved forward with issuing a notice of intent to dismiss. She sued the Regents, alleging they violated her due process rights by not providing her with a Skelly hearing before her demotion. The trial court found against her.
The appellate court ruled that the trial court's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff was never notified of an intent to terminate, and any demotion was voluntary. The unissued letter of intent did not trigger a right to a Skelly hearing. The voluntary demotion was an adverse result, but due process did not require a hearing before the demotion, because due process is not required where the employee has voluntarily surrendered the property interest upon the existence of which the procedural rights depend. Although the choice was a difficult one for the plaintiff, a difficult choice is not the same as an involuntary choice. Although the plaintiff contended that her acquiescence was obtained involuntarily, because she was not told about the letter of intent or that her transfer at normal pay was temporary, the truth was revealed to her and she was given the option of transferring back to her old department with the same title and pay before she made her choice. She therefore made the choice with full knowledge of the consequences. The entity does not violate due process until it takes an adverse action without providing the Skelly safeguards. That her previous supervisor merely considered the adverse action of issuing a notice of termination did not entitle her to a Skelly hearing. It was the plaintiff's prerogative to either risk termination and receive a Skelly hearing, or voluntarily accept the transfer and not have a hearing.
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