In City of Pasadena v. Superior Court (Jauregui), published June 26, 2017, the Second District Court of Appeal, Division 4 issued a writ directing a trial court to sustain the defendant city's demurrer without leave to amend. The plaintiff was diagnosed with mesothelioma in September 2015. In October 2015, she sued various defendants for asbestos exposure. The complaint alleged that her father picked up asbestos to which the plaintiff was exposed at work places including the city, but the complaint did not include the city as a defendant. In August 2016, the plaintiff presented a claim for damages to the city. In October 2016, the plaintiff amended her complaint to include the city as a defendant. The city demurred on the ground that the plaintiff's complaint was presented more than six months after the accrual of her cause of action for asbestos exposure. The trial court overruled the demurrer, on the ground that under the statute of limitations for asbestos exposure, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2, the limitations period had not yet commenced, and so the plaintiff's claim was timely.
The appellate court rejected that analysis. Under Government Code section 901, the date of accrual for purposes of the Government Claims Act is the date that the cause of action would have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations absent any claim requirements. To calculate the claim presentation deadline, the court must determine the date the cause of action accrued under the applicable statute of limitations. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.2,the time for commencement of the action is the later of the date of discovery or the date the plaintiff first suffered disability. Disability is the permanent termination of the person's ability to do her job, actually forcing the person off the job. The plaintiff here was never disabled, so the statute of limitations never began to run for her. But section 340.2 does not use the word "accrued." Instead, under Code of Civil Procedure section 312, a cause of action accrues when the party owning it is entitled to begin and prosecute an action thereon. That is generally immediately upon the commission of the wrong and the occurrence of harm. An exception is delayed discovery. Latent diseases such as mesothelioma are subject to the delayed discovery standard of accrual. The court concluded that as used in Government Code section 901, the date of accrual is the date on which the cause of action became actionable–when it became ripe. Here, that was when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered she had suffered a compensable injury, which was no later than her September 2015 diagnosis. She failed to present her claim within six months of that date, and so did not comply with the Government Claims Act. The court rejected the argument that "accrue" meant only "commencement of the limitations period" under section 340.2. That would lead to the anomalous result that the plaintiff could not bring her action at all, because her limitations period never commenced. Section 340.2 extends the time to bring suit, not the time to present a claim.
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